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Abstract
Based on a comparative project on media and religion across Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden, this article analyzes relationships between religiosity and political attitudes 
in Scandinavia and how these connect with attitudes regarding the representation of 
Islam in various media. Data comes from population-wide surveys conducted in the 
three countries in April 2015. Most Scandinavians relate ‘religion’ with conflict, and 
half of the population perceives Islam as a threat to their national culture. Scandi-
navians thus perceive religion in terms of political tensions and predominantly feel 
that news media should serve a critical function towards Islam and religious conflicts. 
Finally, the results of the empirical analysis are discussed in view of the intertwined 
processes of politicization of Islam and mediatization of religion.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we present an analysis of attitudes towards religion and religious 
conflicts in the three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 
Our analysis focuses on how critical attitudes towards Islam and immigrants 
are related to religious self-identification and political orientation. The study 
considers whether groups with different viewpoints on these issues differ in 
their attitudes towards media representations of religion. We also pay atten-
tion to the role of media as sources of information concerning religion and as 
platforms for discussing conflicts related to religion.
Our study concerns different forms of media. Since several of the survey 
questions consider public representation and debate about religion, ‘news me-
dia’ are often the focus, in other cases ‘public service’ media or ‘social network 
media’ are specifically addressed. When we do not specify a media form, we 
have asked the respondents about their attitudes towards and impressions 
from ‘the media’ in general. As Scandinavians live in a media-saturated envi-
ronment it is not always possible for people to specify their media sources.
2 Background: Religion between Politics and Media
In a European context, Scandinavian countries are, comparatively speaking, 
highly secularized yet influenced by a long history of Protestant Christianity as 
a dominant national religion that was, until recently, institutionalized as state 
churches.1 A common Christian cultural heritage and shared secular values 
are still important characteristics of Scandinavian populations. But, develop-
ments over the past decades have also demonstrated that the three Scandina-
vian countries have to some extent moved in different directions with regard 
to attitudes towards religion, in particular Islam, and its presence in the media 
and other parts of the public sphere. These developments in part concern the 
growing number of migrants and refugees entering Scandinavian countries, 
1 Regarding the point of Scandinavian countries as secularized, see World Values Survey. 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp (accessed 18 April 2017). The majority 
church in Denmark is still a state church.
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the rise of right-wing populist parties, the international war on terror in gen-
eral, and the advent of major terrorist attacks in particular.
Over the past decade, the three Scandinavian countries have experienced 
increased levels of immigration, with a new wave of refugees arriving since the 
summer of 2015. This has led to a more restricted policy towards immigrants 
and refugees in all three Scandinavian countries, including tighter border con-
trols. Sweden has for years had the largest number of refugees and other im-
migrants, even in terms of share of the total population.2 At the peak in 2015, 
a total of 162,877 asked for asylum in Sweden.3 Refugees fleeing conflicts in 
the Middle East, most prominently in Syria, along with conflicts and terrorist 
attacks related to Islam, have resulted in an increased focus on the role of reli-
gion in the public sphere in all three countries.
The growing focus on Islam in news media is documented by a study com-
paring religion in the daily press in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden.4 Coverage of Islam increased from four percent of all newspaper arti-
cles on religion in 1988 to thirteen percent in 2008, when looking at the Nordic 
countries as a whole.5 Coverage of Islam in news and debate articles focuses 
mainly on international conflicts, but recent years have seen increasing focus 
on issues related to integration and discrimination. There are distinct national 
variations. In Danish newspapers, Islam represents the most prominent seg-
ment of religion coverage.
During the same period, religion has become a more frequent theme in 
Scandinavian politics. References to religion in parliamentary debates have 
increased in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Many political parties express a 
positive attitude towards religious diversity, but religion has also been increas-
ingly associated with international conflicts and fundamentalism. Right-wing 
populist parties have increased their support and gained seats in parliament in 
Denmark since 1998, Norway since 1997, and Sweden since 2010. These parties 
2 Silje Vatne Pettersen & Lars Østby, “Skandinavisk komparativ statistikk om integrering: Inn-
vandrere i Norge, Sverige og Danmark,” Samfunnsspeilet 5 (Oslo: Statistics Norway, 2013), 
76–82.
3 Migrationsinfo.se. http://www.migrationsinfo.se/migration/sverige/ (accessed 18 April 2017).
4 Knut Lundby et al., “Religion and the Media: Continuity, Complexity and Mediatization,” in: 
Inger Furseth (ed.), Religious Complexity in the Public Sphere: Comparing Nordic Countries 
(Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), Chapter 5; Kati Niemelä & Henrik Reintoft Chris-
tensen, “Religion in Newspapers in the Nordic Countries in 1988–2008,” Nordic Journal of Re-
ligion and Society 26/1 (2013), 5–24.
5 Lundby et al., “Religion and the Media.” In comparison, coverage of the dominant Lutheran 
majority churches remains strong but has decreased from fifty-seven percent to forty-two 
percent of all main articles reporting on religion over the same period.
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politicize religion through an explicit equation of Christianity with national 
identity and through harsh criticism of Islam as associated with international 
and domestic conflicts.6
In this article, we consider the growing politicization of Islam in light of the 
ways in which news media and social media are implicated in conflicts relating 
to religion, particularly Islam.7 Theories of mediatization and mediatization of 
religion point to media’s role in the construction of religion in contemporary 
society, including the ways in which media have become important sources 
of information about religious issues, as well as tools for active engagement 
with religion.8 Media are not neutral tools of communication but play an ac-
tive, constitutive role in how religion and conflicts over religion play out. The 
Mohammed cartoon crisis in 2005–2006 and the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack 
in 2015 are exemplary cases of how mediated representations of religion can 
become the very object of religious conflict. However, the media-influenced 
perceptions of religion and how these perceptions are acted upon occur in less 
spectacular circumstances as well.
We use mediatization theory to discuss the media’s role as sources of infor-
mation concerning religion and as platforms for representing and discussing 
religion and political conflict associated with religion, against the background 
of attitudes towards religion, particularly Islam, in the Scandinavian countries. 
What perceptions exist regarding the news media’s role in relation to report-
ing, criticism, and tolerance of religion, and are such perceptions of the me-
dia’s role related to religious or political viewpoints?
Our aim with this article is primarily descriptive. This contribution has to be 
elaborated upon in later analyses. Here, we focus on the most distinct similari-
ties and differences in experiences, interpretations, and interactions concern-
ing religion, politics, media, and conflict in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 
6 Jonas Lindberg, Religion in Nordic Politics as a Means to Societal Cohesion: An Empirical Study 
on Party Platforms and Parliamentary Debates 1988–2012. Studies in Religion and Society 13 
(Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2015).
7 Regarding the politicization of religion, see Carolina Ivanescu, “Politicised Religion and the 
Religionisation of Politics,” Culture and Religion 11/4 (2010), 309–325.
8 Stig Hjarvard & Mia Lövheim (eds.), Mediatization and Religion: Nordic Perspectives (Go-
thenburg: Nordicom, 2012); Stig Hjarvard, The Mediatization of Culture and Society (London: 
Routledge, 2013); Knut Lundby (ed.), Mediatization of Communication. Handbooks of Com-
munication Science 21 (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014); Mia Lövheim, “Mediatization and 
Religion,” in: Knut Lundby (ed.), Mediatization of Communication. Handbooks of Communi-
cation Science 21 (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014, 547–570).
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These countries, with their similar cultural attributes and institutional ar-
rangements, can be seen as a particularly good case for comparative analysis.9
3 A Cross-National Scandinavian Survey
We present and discuss the findings of a survey with nationwide representa-
tive samples of the adult populations of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. This 
comparative survey is the first in Scandinavia to measure experiences of medi-
ated religion in everyday life in terms of attitudes towards the representation 
of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity in the media, as well as uses of the media 
as a platform for discussing religion and religious extremism. The survey thus 
offers an opportunity to further understand relationships between political 
orientation, religious self-identification, and attitudes towards the media in 
Scandinavia. The survey was undertaken using web panels of around 1000 re-
spondents aged sixteen years or above in each country.10
The survey discloses that, in the Scandinavian setting, attitudes towards and 
debates on religion in the public sphere, particularly in the news media, focus 
on Islam. This will form the center of our analyses. Because the survey was 
undertaken in April 2015, it cannot account for possible changes in attitudes 
regarding migrants generated by the strong increase in those seeking asylum 
in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway in the latter half of 2015. The survey is part 
of the project Engaging with Conflicts in Mediatized Religious Environments 
(CoMRel).11 This project aims to examine how religion in public spaces be-
comes thematized and enacted through the (news) media, as well as further 
articulated in face-to-face social interaction or through social media.12
9 Erik Damgaard, “Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries,” in: Erik Damgaard et al. 
(eds.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 
1992, 191–205). See also Lindberg, Religion in Nordic Politics.
10 tns Gallup (in Norway and Denmark) and tns Sifo (in Sweden). Data gathered 16–21 
April 2015. All data has been weighted by gender, age, and geographical region to ensure 
that the samples are as representative as possible, however, the samples were not weight-
ed by education. CoMRel researchers, in cooperation with tns staff, formulated the ques-
tions. The survey is documented in Norwegian on the CoMRel web. See Knut Lundby & 
Salve Jortveit, Dokumentasjon av CoMRel survey april 2015. www.hf.uio.no/imk/english/
research/projects/comrel/comrel-survey-dokumentasjon.pdf (accessed 18 April 2017).
11 This is a comparative Scandinavian study, funded by the Research Council of Norway 
under the Programme on the Cultural Conditions Underlying Social Change (samkul).
12 Knut Lundby (ed.), Contesting Religion: The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scan-
dinavia (Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming 2018).
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In the following, we first present relationships between political orienta-
tion and religious self-identification in the Scandinavian countries. Then, we 
present findings on how Scandinavians view religion in the media and their 
expectations for media coverage of religion. We also show whether and where 
news on religion is discussed in the media. Finally, we relate these findings to 
attitudes towards religion and national culture in the Scandinavian countries. 
In the conclusion, we discuss similarities and differences between the coun-
tries and how politicization of religion may relate to the mediatized conditions 
of religion, particularly the workings of the news media.
4 Political Orientation and Religious Self-Identification
In order to describe a respondent’s political orientation, we constructed a vari-
able based on information from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (ches) in 2014 and 
the respondent’s answer concerning which political party he or she would 
vote for if an election were held today.13 We have placed the survey answers in 
one of three categories in terms of views on democratic freedoms and rights: 
‘ libertarian/post-materialist,’ ‘center,’ or ‘traditional/authoritarian.’14 The dis-
tributions of respondents in the three Scandinavian countries are shown in 
Figure 1.
In Denmark, there is a stronger tendency towards polarization  between 
 libertarian/post-materialist and traditional/authoritarian political  orientations 
than is present in Norway and Sweden. In these two countries, the ‘center’ 
holds more ground as over half of the voters align with political parties in the 
middle of this spectrum.
It is difficult to grasp people’s religiosity using surveys. In this study, we fol-
low a common practice in studies of individual religiosity by starting with 
a respondent’s self-identification. On the basis of the options of identifying 
as ‘religious’ and being a ‘believer,’ we constructed a variable that describes 
13 Ryan Bakker et al., Chapel Hill Expert Survey—Version 2015.1 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina, 2015). http://chesdata.eu/2014/2014_CHES_codebook.pdf (accessed 18 
April 2017).
14 The categories are based on ches’s expert coding of party positions in terms of views on 
democratic freedoms and rights (the gal-tan 11-point scale). Examples of ‘libertarian/
post-materialist’ parties include Enhedslisten and Liberal Alliance in Denmark, Venstre in 
Norway, and Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet de Gröna in Sweden. Examples of ‘traditional/ 
authoritarian’ parties include Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and Kristelig Folkeparti and 
Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, as well as Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden. Parties that 
 occupy the ‘center’ include Socialdemokraterna and Venstre in Denmark, Arbeiderpartiet 
and Høyre in Norway, and Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna in Sweden.
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a  respondent’s strength of religious self-identification.15 Those respondents 
with a ‘strong or moderate’ religious self-identification fully or to some extent 
identify themselves with these terms. Those with a ‘weaker or no’ religious self-
identification do not or only to a small extent regard themselves as ‘religious’ 
or ‘believers.’
Exactly one-third of the Scandinavian respondents, considered as a whole, 
can be categorized as possessing strong or moderate religious  self-identification 
while two-thirds possess weaker or no religious self-identification. As shown 
in Figure 2, religious self-identification is weaker among Swedes than among 
Danes and Norwegians. In all three countries, strong or  moderate religious 
self-identification is more prevalent among women than among men.
There is a weak but significant positive correlation between ‘political 
 orientation’ and ‘religious self-identification’: this is strongest in  Norway (.228) 
15 In the survey, we asked several questions on how respondents defined themselves in rela-
tion to religion. Following a factor analysis of several components related to religious self-
identification, we constructed a new variable on the basis of the following two questions: 
‘To what extent do you regard yourself as religious?’; and ‘To what extent do you regard 
yourself as a believer?’ From the context in which the two questions were posed and from 
the correlation between them, we are able to assume that self-identification as a ‘believer’ 
comes close to the category of ‘religious.’
Figure 1 Political orientation in Scandinavia (gal-tan scale)—percentages
Note: A respondent is classified as ‘libertarian/post-materialist’ if his or her preferred party 
scores between 0 and 3 on the gal-tan scale, ‘center’ if the party scores between 3.01 and 6.99, 
and ‘traditional/authoritarian’ if the party scores between 7 and 10. ‘Other’ includes respondents 
who would not vote or would vote for a party not included in the survey.
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and weakest in Sweden (.119), with Denmark in the middle (.177).16  Among 
Norwegian and Danish respondents, those with stronger religious self-iden-
tification orient themselves more towards traditional/ authoritarian political 
values than those with weaker religious self-identification. Conversely, re-
spondents with weaker religious self-identification orient themselves more 
towards libertarian/post-materialist values than those with stronger religious 
self-identification.
5 Religion in the Media: A Matter of News and Political Issues
Despite the increased focus on Islam in Scandinavian news media, Scandina-
vians do not favor ‘religion’ as a designated media topic in general. Respon-
dents were asked to rank their interest in the following eight categories of 
topics within ‘the media’: culture, business, politics, religion, sex and partner-
ship, sports, entertainment, and science. In Denmark and Sweden, religion was 
ranked last on average, and religion was ranked second to last on average in 
Norway. Although Scandinavians place low priority on ‘religion’ as a designated 
dish in their general media diet, around half of the adult Scandinavian popula-
tion discusses news concerning religion on at least a monthly basis. More than 
16 Political orientation = gal/tan score (0–10). Religious self-identification: 0 = no 
 religious self-identification; 1 = weak religious self-identification; 2 = moderate religious 
 self-identification; and 3 = strong religious self-identification. All correlations (Pearson’s 
r) are significant at the 0.01-level (two-tailed).
Figure 2 Religious self-identification in Scandinavia—percentages
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one in four Scandinavians share their thoughts and concerns regarding news 
on religion with others on a daily or weekly basis.17
When asked what aspects of religion they are most interested in finding 
in the media in general, ‘religion in the news’ is the top priority, before ‘reli-
gion and politics.’ These are followed by ‘religion and culture,’ then ‘religion as 
moral reflection,’ and then ‘religion in entertainment.’ At the bottom of the list 
comes ‘worship and devotions.’ The ranking is the same in all three countries.
Thus, for Scandinavians, religion in the media is primarily a topic in the 
news and a matter of politics and culture in the widest sense rather than a 
personal matter of spirituality, reflection, and belief.
6 The Media Expected to Be Critical towards Religion
Respondents in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were asked several questions 
on what ‘the media’ ought to do in the coverage of religion. The questions are 
asked on ‘the media’ in general but may for most people connote mass media 
and more specifically news media. The answers can be compared as all ques-
tions used the same scale, ranging from ‘fully agree’ to ‘partly agree’ to ‘neither/
nor’ to ‘partly disagree’ to ‘fully disagree.’ Table 1 shows the combined percent-
ages of those who ‘fully’ or ‘partly’ agree with the various statements. Those 
who do not know what to answer or do not want to answer are included in 
the tabulations. The figures in Table 1 thus show explicit support for the state-
ments among all respondents in the three countries.
If respondents understand ‘religious topics’ as relating to particular beliefs, 
Table 1 confirms the low interest disclosed above even though one in four in-
dividuals feels that the media should give more attention to religious topics.
Scandinavians are more positive towards the media critically examining Is-
lam, Judaism, and Christianity than they are towards more extensive media 
coverage of these religions. Norwegians expect the media to be more critical 
than do their neighbors. While half of all Norwegians think that the media 
should be more critical of Islam, only a quarter would like to learn more about 
Islam from broader coverage.
Again, religion arises as a matter of public concern and critique. Scandi-
navians would like the media to be critical towards religion and cover con-
flicts and problematic aspects concerning religion. However, the media are 
 expected to invite dialogue over tensions related to religion. On all of these 
17 Denmark 28.0%, Norway 29.9%, Sweden 27.7%. ‘Don’t know’ and ‘do not want to answer’ 
were included in the tabulation.
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statements, Norwegians are somewhat more in agreement with one another 
than are Danes and Swedes.
Humor and satire on religion—in entertainment media—is  widely  accepted, 
affirmed by two-thirds of Scandinavians. Upon further questioning, one-third 
of Scandinavians even fully or partly agree that statements  scorning religion 
should be allowed. Again, such attitudes are somewhat more prominent among 
Norwegians than among Danes and Swedes.
When considering the world surrounding them, Scandinavians regard re-
ligion as leading to conflict rather than to peace. This sentiment is somewhat 
more widespread in Denmark than in the two other countries: eight out of ten 
Danes fully or partly agree. Only six percent of Danes disagree that religion 
leads to conflict rather than to peace (see Figure 3).
Since Scandinavians relate religion to conflict to such a large degree, it 
makes sense that they want the media to be critical of religion. This helps us 
understand that news concerning religion catches more interest among people 
than does information on religious practices and institutions. When religion 
becomes something to which people must be alert, as a contentious challenge 
to society and individual lives, it is understandable that people discuss religion 
that appears in the news, particularly news on religious extremism.
Table 1 Percentage of the respondents who fully or partly agree with statements on what the 
media ought to do in their coverage of religion
The media ought to… DENMARK NORWAY SWEDEN
… give more attention to religious topics 25.5 32.3 23.7
… give space for conflicts on religion 72.0 85.3 74.7
… be critical on problematic aspects of rel. 75.8 80.8 71.2
… cover religion in satirical ways 65.0 68.1 64.3
… invite dialogue when tension over rel. 72.3 81.0 75.5
… cover Judaism more extensively 19.2 26.1 27.3
… be more critical of Judaism 33.9 42.1 33.7
… cover Christianity more extensively 29.3 33.5 32.8
… be more critical of Christianity 34.7 42.4 35.3
… cover Islam more extensively 18.7 24.3 27.3
… be more critical of Islam 41.2 51.4 43.5
(N) (1006) (1099) (999)
Note: ‘Don’t know’ and ‘do not want to answer’ included in the base.
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 7  Discussions on Religious Extremism 
 Two-thirds of those who discuss news concerning religion in the media on 
a daily or weekly basis include news concerning religious  extremism in such 
talks. Hence, some more than one-fourth of respondents discuss news on re-
ligious extremism daily or weekly (see  Figure  4 ). Scandinavians’ discussions 
concerning religion in the news thus center on (but are not exclusive to) reli-
gious extremism. 
 In what settings do Scandinavians discuss news on religious extremism? 
Generally, such discussions take place in close social contexts, at home with 
the family, with friends, at school or the workplace, or to some extent in cafés 
or similar social meeting places. However, some take discussions on religious 
extremism to the internet. 18 While only around three percent of Scandinavians 
discussed religious extremism in commentary fields or online discussion fo-
rums during the previous twelve months, around nine percent did so on social 
media, like Twitter and Facebook. Furthermore, three-fifths of  respondents 
who had participated in discussions concerning religion on social media re-
ported that they had participated in debates concerning religious extrem-
ism. Extremism thus appears to be a major, though not necessarily dominant, 
concern among a plurality of those who discuss religion on the internet. 
18  Alternatives given were: ‘at home with the family’; ‘with friends’; ‘at work or school’; ‘on 
social media (e.g. Facebook or Twitter)’; ‘in commentary fields on online newspapers or 
in discussion forums on the internet’; ‘in church or at other religious localities’; ‘in cafés 
or other places where people go out’; ‘don’t know’; and ‘no answer.’ 
 Figure 3  Looking at the world, religion leads to conflict rather than to peace—percentages 
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 Particularly in commentary fields and online discussion forums, other aspects 
of religion seem quite prevalent. Only one-third of respondents who had par-
ticipated in discussions concerning religion in commentary fields and online 
discussion forums reported that they had participated in debates on religious 
extremism.
8 Religion as a Perceived Threat to National Culture
The concern about religious extremism is primarily directed towards Islam. 
This is also the case when it comes to the perceived negative influence of vari-
ous religions on national culture. Nearly half of the Scandinavians in the sur-
vey see Islam as a threat to their national culture. However, some see even 
Christianity and Judaism as threats to the national culture. Some six to eight 
percent of Scandinavians regard Christianity as a threat, and around eleven 
percent regard Judaism as a threat.
When analyzing critical attitudes towards Islam, national differences 
come through. More than half of Danes fully or partly agree that Islam con-
stitutes a threat to Danish culture. This is the case for four out of ten Swedes, 
with  Norwegians positioned between the two others (see Figure 5). It is also 
 important to note that we can identify a strong division in attitudes in all 
three countries: a large minority in all three countries either fully or partly dis-
agree that  Islam poses a threat to national culture: around thirty-one percent 
in  Denmark,  thirty-six percent in Norway, and forty-two percent in Sweden. 
 Given the focus on Islam among our respondents, the remainder of this article 
Figure 4 How often do you discuss news on religious extremism with others?
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will concentrate on the divergent attitudes among Scandinavians regarding 
 Islam as a threat to national culture.
9 Hostility against Foreigners and Attitudes towards Islam
How does this perceived threat from Islam resonate among respondents in the 
survey? We asked the respondents whether they would tolerate hostile atti-
tudes against foreigners. In all three countries, a majority were unwilling to 
tolerate such attitudes, the Swedes more clearly than their neighbors. Among 
them, the Danes are somewhat more tolerant to hostile attitudes towards for-
eigners than are the Norwegians (see Figure 6).
The sense that Islam poses a threat (see Figure 5) is much more prominent 
than is tolerance of hostile attitudes towards foreigners (see Figure  6). The 
Swedish respondents tolerate hostility towards foreigners and regard Islam as a 
threat to their culture to a lesser degree than do other Scandinavians. As shown 
in the previous section, a large majority of Scandinavians feel that religion 
leads to conflict rather than to peace (see Figure 3). This correlates positively 
in all three countries with the view of Islam as a threat to national culture.19 
Thus, the conflictual view of religion appears to center on Islam.
The widespread perception that Islam poses a threat to national culture is 
not clearly associated with a general acceptance of hostility towards  foreigners. 
On the contrary, in all three Scandinavian countries a majority of those who 
19 The correlation (Pearson’s r) is .327 in Sweden; .281 in Norway; and .215 in Denmark. All 
correlations are significant at the 0.01-level (two-tailed).
Figure 5 Islam perceived as a threat to Danish/Norwegian/Swedish culture
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consider Islam as a threat to their national culture do not accept hostile atti-
tudes towards foreigners (see Figure 7).
Only one-quarter of those who perceive Islam as such a threat say that they 
fully or partly tolerate hostile attitudes towards foreigners. Among respon-
dents having this position regarding the two questions, we find more men than 
women in all three countries. A critical perception of Islam is, therefore, not 
necessarily an index for hostility against foreigners. This is interesting, since 
public debates about these issues may tend to conflate the two questions. In 
particular, populist parties in all three Scandinavian countries have tried to 
use criticism of Islam as an argument to harden attitudes towards immigrants, 
but, for many Scandinavians, the coupling between perceptions of threats to 
national culture and attitudes towards foreigners seems to be less obvious and 
less directly connected than perhaps expected.
The relationship between tolerance of hostile attitudes against foreigners 
and perception of Islam as a threat to national culture is, however, not unre-
lated and if we look among those respondents who accept hostile attitudes 
they are positively correlated with each other. Within the minority of Scan-
dinavians who agree that hostile attitudes towards foreigners should be toler-
ated, a majority (69.5%) regard Islam as a threat to their national culture.20
20 There is a positive correlation (Pearson’s r) between the two variables in all three coun-
tries: strongest in Sweden (.433), weakest in Denmark (.192), with Norway in the middle 
(.297). All correlations are significant at the 0.01-level (two-tailed).
Figure 6 Hostile attitudes against foreigners should be tolerated—percentages
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10 Gender, Age, Political, and Religious Orientation
In the combined Scandinavian sample, the inclination to (fully or partly) per-
ceive Islam as a threat to national culture is stronger among men (fifty-two 
percent) than among women (forty-one percent). Similarly, this tendency be-
comes stronger with age (from thirty-five percent among Scandinavians under 
the age of thirty to fifty-three percent among those sixty years or older).
There is a substantial positive correlation between political orientation and 
Islam as a perceived threat to national culture, meaning that there is a ten-
dency for those who vote for political parties that the ches survey identify 
as more traditional or authoritarian to also perceive Islam as a threat to their 
national culture and for those who vote for libertarian/post-materialist parties 
to perceive Islam as less of a threat. The correlation occurs in all three coun-
tries but is stronger in Sweden and Denmark than in Norway (Denmark: .456; 
Norway: .299; Sweden: .493).21 While this finding might fit our expectations, 
it is perhaps more surprising that there is practically no correlation between 
religious self-identification and perception of Islam as a threat to national 
cultures. As such, there appears to be little difference in attitudes regarding 
Islam depending on whether individuals possess stronger or weaker religious 
21 All correlations (Pearson’s r) are significant at the 0.01-level (two-tailed). Political orienta-
tion = gal/tan score. Islam perceived as a threat to national culture: 1 = fully disagree; 
2 = partly disagree; 3 = neither/nor; 4 = partly agree; and 5 = fully agree. The categories for 
Islam as a perceived threat are also employed in the following correlations in which this 
variable is employed.
Figure 7 Tolerance for hostile attitudes against foreigners among people considering islam a 
threat to national culture—percentages
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self-identification. This is the case for Norway (.057) and Sweden (.048) while 
there is a weak but significant correlation for Denmark (.146).22 In the case of 
Denmark, then, there seems to be a slight tendency for those with strong reli-
gious self-identification to also perceive Islam as a threat to Danish culture to 
a greater extent than do those possessing weaker religious self-identification.
11 Islam as a Perceived Threat and Discussion of Religion in Media
As shown in Figure 4, Scandinavians frequently discuss news on religious ex-
tremism with others. However, in Denmark and Norway, there is essentially no 
correlation between the degree to which respondents perceive Islam as a threat 
to their national culture and the frequency with which they discuss religious 
extremism.23 In other words, both proponents and opponents of this perceived 
threat engage in debate about religious extremism. Among Swedes, there is a 
weak but significant negative correlation (−.135).24 This implies that there is a 
slight tendency in Sweden for respondents who are most keen to discuss reli-
gious extremism in the news to also regard Islam as a threat to Swedish culture.
We may include all debates on religion in various online media, not just on 
religious extremism, in relation to the perceived threat from Islam. In Sweden 
and Norway, there seems to be no such correlation, while in Denmark there is 
a significant but weak positive correlation (0.081) between participation in on-
line debates on religion and perception of Islam as a threat to Danish culture.25 
Among Danes, there thus seems to be a very weak tendency for those who 
participate in online debates on religion to also perceive Islam as a threat to 
Danish culture to a greater extent than those who do not participate in  online 
debates.26
22 The correlation (Pearson’s r) for Denmark is significant at the 0.01-level (two-tailed). 
Religious self-identification: 0 = no religious self-identification; 1 = weak religious 
self-identification; 2 = moderate religious self-identification; and 3 = strong religious 
 self-identification. The correlations for Norway and Sweden are not significant.
23 Denmark: −.051; Norway: .025.
24 This correlation (Pearson’s r) is significant at the 0.01-level (two-tailed). Discussions con-
cerning religious extremism: 1 = daily or weekly; 2 = monthly; and 3 = more seldom or 
never.
25 This correlation is significant at the 0.05-level (two-tailed). Participated in online debates 
on religion during the last year: 0 = no; 1 = yes.
26 The above correlations do not suggest a linear correlation between the selected variables, 
but there is some support for a curvilinear relationship. This implies that respondents 
who fully agree and fully disagree that Islam constitutes a threat to their national culture 
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12 Similarities and Differences in Scandinavia?
In this study, Denmark stands out as the most polarized and conflict-oriented 
country and Sweden as the most liberal and secular country when it comes to 
attitudes regarding religion. The Norwegians take a middle position. Whereas 
over half of Danes perceive Islam as a threat to Danish culture, this is the case 
for less than forty percent of Swedes.
These findings resonate with a comparative study of the relationship be-
tween national identity and religion in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden from 
2013.27 This study showed that religious aspects, namely the importance of be-
ing a Christian in order to be a true citizen, as a vital part of national identity 
were most pronounced in Denmark. However, compared with other countries 
in Western Europe, religious nationalism holds a relatively weak position in 
all of the Scandinavian countries. The study concludes that Sweden and Nor-
way are quite alike when it comes to dimensions of national identity. Denmark 
seems to most frequently be the deviant case.28
One possible interpretation of these differences is that they are results of 
different national policies, particularly regarding immigration from Muslim 
countries, but also in terms of specific national experiences, such as the car-
toon crisis in Denmark. Furthermore, the international war on terror has pro-
vided an important context for developments of attitudes towards Islam and 
has been a major issue in the news media. Here, the Scandinavian countries 
have had different official policies regarding the military conflict. From 2001 
and onwards, Denmark has taken a very active role in military operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and this has often been supported by the 
to a large extent take part in online discussions concerning religion and also discuss re-
ligious extremism more often. However, these tendencies are trivial (the highest correla-
tion is −.111) and not significant for all of the countries.
27 The survey, National Symbols 2013, involved 1500 representative samples of Norwegians, 
1000 Danes, and 1000 Swedes and was conducted by kifo through the bureau Norstat. Pål 
Ketil Botvar, “Does One Have to Be a Christian to Be Truly Norwegian? The Relationship 
Between Religion and National Identity,” in: Anna-Sara Lind, Mia Lövheim, & Ulf Zackari-
asson (eds.), Religion, Law and Democracy: New Challenges for Society and Research (Lund: 
Nordic Academic Press, 2016), 199–215.
28 Pål Ketil Botvar, “Scandinavian Folk Churches, Chauvinism and Xenophobia,” in: Annika 
Hvithamar, Margit Warburg, & Brian Arly Jacobsen (eds.), Holy Nations and Global Iden-
tities: Civil Religion, Nationalism, and Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 183–198; Botvar, 
“Does One Have to Be a Christian.”
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news media.29 Sweden has, comparatively speaking, been less involved in pro-
longed military action, while Norway represents a mid-level military engage-
ment among the three countries. The representation of Islamic terrorism in 
news media during these wars may also, in various ways, come to influence 
general attitudes towards religion and refugees. Although there are such dif-
ferences between the three countries, the overall similarities in Scandinavia 
are more striking. The three countries, after all, share much of the same reli-
gious history and have similar political and media systems, strongly embedded 
within the Scandinavian model of welfare societies.
13 Politicized Islam and Mediatized Religion
Our results generally reflect that Islam has become a highly politicized issue 
that divides public opinion in significant ways. General political fault lines 
tend to coincide with attitudes towards Islam: respondents with traditional 
or authoritarian political values are more prone to think of Islam as a threat, 
whereas respondents with libertarian and post-materialist values more often 
reject this idea. In general, religious self-identification plays a less important 
role for the formation of these general attitudes towards Islam. In this respect, 
basic political orientations are more important than religious orientations.
Our analysis has focused on controversies regarding Islam, politics, and the 
media, but it is worth recalling that our survey also covered questions con-
cerning other religions and non-political aspects regarding religion in the 
media. However, respondents show only limited interest in media coverage of 
other aspects of religion, such as moral reflection or worship and devotion. 
They strongly support the media’s role of providing space for reporting and 
discussions concerning conflicts involving religion, as well as taking a critical 
stance towards problematic aspects of religion, including providing satire of 
religion. Respondents also recognize the media’s role as possible arbitrators of 
conflicts by supporting the media in initiating dialogue in case of tension over 
religious issues. Furthermore, news media reporting is a frequent source of dis-
cussions concerning religious extremism, and social media and other online 
media represent venues in which some people discuss religious issues, albeit 
not to the same extent as in familiar contexts, such as the home or the work-
place, which remain the preferred contexts for such discussions. These results 
indicate that, when it comes to news reporting and public debate concerning 
29 Stig Hjarvard & Nete Nørgaard Kristensen, “When Media of a Small Nation Argue for War,” 
Media, War & Conflict 7/1 (2014), 51–69.
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religion,  religion is a mediatized phenomenon at the level of interests and atti-
tudes. News media are not just an important source of information concerning 
religion; respondents’ interests in and attitudes towards religious issues seem 
to be very much in accordance with general journalistic news values and the 
news media’s role as a critical watchdog in society.
The results of this survey provide a basis for the hypothesis that politiciza-
tion of Islam and mediatization of religion are mutually reinforcing processes. 
The politicization of Islam makes it more newsworthy and thus visible in the 
public sphere, and the mediatization of religion involves the news media’s 
construction of Islam as a conflict-ridden topic, so that less attention is paid to 
other dimensions of this religion. Even though Islam is perceived by many as 
a threat to the cultures of Scandinavian countries, respondents show limited 
interest in news media reporting on cultural, spiritual, or other aspects of re-
ligion, and respondents’ discussions concerning religion are oriented towards 
the political and conflict-ridden dimensions of Islam. Not only news media 
and politics seem to work in tandem to represent Islam in contentious ways, 
but also other forms of media dynamics in, for instance, social network media 
add to this politicized and critical perception of Islam. It is, however, beyond 
the scope of this predominantly descriptive study (based on a single compara-
tive survey on attitudes) to further substantiate such a hypothesis regarding 
the reciprocity of politicization and mediatization.
Our comparative study on media, politics, and religion suggests that, despite 
common characteristics, Scandinavian countries display some notable differ-
ences. To what extent these differences will grow or diminish in the future is 
difficult to say since this study does not report developmental trends. However, 
given the current refugee crises and its political repercussions at both eu and 
national levels, the intensified war on terror, and the rising influence of popu-
list parties, it seems likely that Islam will continue to be high on the agenda 
of both politics and news media and that the interplay between media and 
politics may amplify existing attitudinal differences within individual Scandi-
navian countries and perhaps also between them.
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